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“PLAY OR PAY”: INTERPRETING THE EMPLOYER 
MANDATE OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND 




Throughout the last decade, Native American tribes have seen a drastic 
increase in the expansion of economic enterprises. This boom, due 
primarily to the introduction of large-scale casinos to Native American 
reservations, has led to an equally drastic increase in the employment of 
non-Native American employees by tribal employers. With more 
employees comes more employment disputes, and what has followed has 
been a wave of lawsuits that have forced courts to determine whether 
federal labor and employment statutes can and should be applied to Native 
American tribes. The analysis performed by the courts in making this 
determination involves several factors to be considered. However, the 
primary question has become whether Congress intended these statutes to 
apply to Native American tribes.  
The most recent federal labor and employment statute is the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). Signed into law on March 23, 
2010, the ACA has been the center of a significant amount of controversy 
regarding health care reform.1 Despite heavy political opposition2 and 
continuous technical woes,3 the ACA is up and running and is projected to 
insure thirty-two million new Americans over the next decade.4 A major 
component of the ACA is the employer mandate, under which certain 
                                                                                                                 
 * Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. ObamaCare Facts: Affordable Care Act, Health Insurance Marketplace, 
OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obamacarefacts.com/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).  
 2. Mary Ann Chirba-Martin, ERISA Preemption of State “Play or Pay” Mandates: 
How PPCA Clouds an Already Confusing Picture, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 393, 395 
(2010). 
 3. Roberta Rampton, Days Before Launch, Obamacare Failed to Handle Even 500 
Users, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2013, 9:54 PM EST), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/22/ 
us-usa-healthcare-website-idUSBRE9AL03K20131122 (describing “alarming results from 
performance tests” and a troubled rollout of the new health care system). 
 4. Nancy-Ann DeParle, The Affordable Care Act Helps America’s Uninsured, WHITE 
HOUSE (Sept. 16, 2010, 2:33 PM EST), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/09/16/afford 
able-care-act-helps-america-s-uninsured.  
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employers are required to provide health insurance to their employees or 
face a significant fine.5 In the wake of the passage of the ACA, countless 
lawsuits have been initiated challenging the constitutionality of the 
employer mandate. It remains to be seen how the courts will rule on this 
issue; however, one thing is certain: there has been nothing short of 
confusion for employers attempting to comply with the Act’s hefty 
requirements and navigate its various provisions.  
The unique relationship between Native American tribes and the federal 
government has led courts to apply special canons of construction when 
interpreting the applicability of federal statutes to Native American tribes. 
Because the ACA expressly exempts Native Americans from the individual 
mandate, yet remains silent on the issue of Native American employers, it is 
undoubtedly a source of great confusion for tribal employers and employees 
alike. This Comment provides a thorough analysis of whether the employer 
mandate of the ACA applies to tribal businesses owned and operated by 
Native Americans and located on Indian Country.6 Part II provides a brief 
history of tribal sovereignty within the United States, as well as an 
overview of the current relationship between tribes and the federal 
government. Part III describes the applicability of various federal labor and 
employment statutes to Native American tribes and provides an explanation 
of the detailed analysis the courts perform in reaching their decision. Part 
IV details the requirements of the employer mandate of the ACA and 
discusses whether that mandate should apply to Native American tribes, 
specifically in instances where they employ solely Native American 
employees and instances where they employee non-Native American 
employees as well as Native American employees. Additionally, Part IV 
addresses the problems with the current analysis, focusing on whether 
Native Americans should be considered “employees” under the ACA for 
purposes of determining employer size and assessing penalty taxes. 
                                                                                                                 
 5. ObamaCare Employer Mandate, OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obamacarefacts.com/ 
obamacare-employer-mandate/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
 6. The term “Indian Country” is defined as all land within the limits of any Indian 
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all 
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the 
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits 
of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, 
including rights-of-way running through the same. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). 
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Before analyzing the application of federal labor and employment 
statutes to Indian tribes, it is important to understand the backdrop against 
which this analysis takes place, including both the historical treatment of 
Indians and the current relationship between Native American tribes and the 
federal government. Native American tribes are considered sovereign 
nations and, as such, maintain the right to be self-governing.7 Self-
governance includes the powers to: determine the form of government; 
enact laws; enforce laws within tribal jurisdiction; tax; and exclude 
unauthorized individuals from tribal territory.8 However, tribal sovereignty 
has been limited by the imposition of federal sovereign powers and is 
subject to total divestment by Congress. Unless and until Congress acts, 
however, tribes retain their sovereign powers.9 As far back as the 1800s, 
Chief Justice Marshall stated in Johnson v. M’Intosh that the “discovery” 
and subsequent conquest of North America by Europeans “necessarily 
diminished” Native American sovereignty.10 The issue was revisited in 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia when Justice Marshall asserted that Native 
American tribes were not “foreign states,” but were analogous to the states, 
or “domestic dependent nations, capable of managing their own affairs.”11 
Similarly, as stated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Kagama: 
[The Indians] were, and always have been, regarded as having a 
semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal 
relations; not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the 
full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the 
power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus 
far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within 
whose limits they resided.12 
Regardless, the generally accepted rule is that Native American tribes enjoy 
immunity from enforcement of federal laws, and retain their tribal 
sovereign powers. Tribal sovereignty, however, is not absolute and may be 
divested by Congress where retention of sovereign power by a tribe is 
                                                                                                                 
 7. FELIX COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 217-20 (Rennard Strickland et 
al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN].  
 8. Id. 
 9.  United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 316 (1978). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2 (1831).  
 12. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886). 
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inconsistent with the interests of the federal government.13 This is 
evidenced in the current trend among court decisions to restrict the 
application of sovereign immunity to Native American tribes, thereby 
limiting its reach. 
Despite the uncertainty associated with the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, 
the Supreme Court has definitively settled three important issues: (1) tribes 
have nearly unlimited power over “internal affairs”;14 (2) states do not have 
the authority to infringe on tribal sovereignty; and (3) Congress has plenary 
power to limit tribal sovereignty.15 The implication of these rulings is that 
Native American tribes are not subject to the same federal laws and 
regulations as the remainder of the population. The Supreme Court has 
stated, “the standard principles of statutory construction do not have their 
usual force in cases involving Indian law.”16 Rather, “[b]ecause of the 
unique legal status of Indians in American jurisprudence, legal doctrines 
often must be viewed from a different perspective from that which would 
obtain in other areas of the law.”17 Thus the normal rules of statutory 
construction do not apply. Instead, the analysis must be guided by doctrines 
specific to Indian law—special canons of construction. These canons 
require that, “(1) ambiguities in a federal statute must be resolved in favor 
of Indians, and (2) a clear expression of Congressional intent is necessary 
before a court may construe a federal statute as to impair tribal 
sovereignty.”18 In essence, the presumption is that a federal law should not 
be construed to limit tribal sovereignty without a clear and unambiguous 
expression from Congress saying otherwise.  
III. Application of General Applicability Statutes to Native American Tribes 
There are two types of federal statutes: general applicability statutes and 
non-general applicability statutes.  A “general applicability” statute refers to 
a statute addressed to “all persons” and is therefore “generally applicable” 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 380 (1876). 
 14. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 171 (1982) (“[T]he use of the 
word “sovereign” to characterize tribal powers of self-government is surely appropriate.”). 
 15. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) (“The right 
of tribal self-government is ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad power of 
Congress.”). 
 16. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).  
 17. Id. 
 18. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). 
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to everyone, such as a criminal statute.19 In contrast, statutes that are not 
generally applicable are directed at a specific group of people and therefore 
apply to only a limited class.20 Because of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, 
the general rule is that, “under the Constitution of the United States, as 
originally established . . . General Acts of Congress did not apply to Indians 
unless so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to include them.”21 
This was the case for the better part of the nineteenth century; however, that 
rule became much more complicated with the case of Federal Power 
Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation.  
A. The Tuscarora Rule 
Prior to Tuscarora, the Court consistently held that federal statutes of 
general applicability did not apply to Native American tribes or their 
individual members.22 In Tuscarora, the ultimate question presented was 
whether the Federal Power Act granted New York the authority to take land 
from the Tuscarora Indian Nation for a hydroelectric power project in 
exchange for just compensation. The Tuscarora Indian Nation argued, 
among other things, that the Federal Power Act was a statute of general 
applicability and, according to traditional canons of construction, Native 
American tribes were outside the scope of its reach unless Congress “so 
expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to include them.”23 The Court, 
however, found this argument unconvincing, stating in direct contrast with 
long-standing principles, “it is now well settled by many decisions of this 
Court that a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Native 
Americans and their property interests.”24 The Federal Power Act 
specifically limited its application of eminent domain to tribes and thus the 
language regarding tribal sovereignty is likely dicta and not controlling; 
however, the language in Tuscarora is nevertheless difficult to reconcile 
with both the canons of construction and the Supreme Court precedent that 
follows it.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 19. Jeffrey M. Shaman, Rules of General Applicability, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 419, 
419 (2012).  
 20. Id. 
 21. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884).  
 22. See id. at 99-100. 
 23. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960) (quoting 
Elk, 112 U.S. at 99-100). 
 24. Id. at 116. 
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Since Tuscarora was decided, the Supreme Court has not only declined 
to cite it in any subsequent case, but has repeatedly supported the traditional 
canons of construction that are directly contrary to its decision in Tuscarora. 
In Montana v. Blackfeet Indian Tribe, the Supreme Court considered 
whether the state of Montana could tax the Blackfeet Indian Tribe for 
royalty income from leases issued to non-Indian lessees pursuant to the 
Indian Mineral Leasing Act.25 The Court applied the Indian canons of 
construction. Finding nothing in either the Act’s text or the legislative 
history that suggested congressional intent to tax Indian tribes, the Court 
applied the statute liberally in favor of the Indians and refused to uphold the 
tax.26 Subsequently, in United States v. Dion, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
the need for express congressional intent, stating, “[we do not] construe 
statutes as abrogating treaty rights in a backhanded way; in the absence of 
explicit statement, the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty right is not to 
be lightly imputed to the Congress.”27 In Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
LaPlante, the Supreme Court stressed the importance of tribal self-
government and held that tribes retain all inherent attributes of sovereignty 
that have not been expressly divested by the Federal Government.28 
Specifically, “the proper influence from silence … is that the sovereign 
power … remains intact.”29 The Court echoed this sentiment in Minnesota 
v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, stating in no uncertain terms, 
“Congress may abrogate Indian treaty rights, but it must clearly express its 
intent to do so.”30  
C. Tuscarora in the Circuit Courts 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Tuscarora, the Ninth Circuit 
carved out three exceptions to the Tuscarora Rule in the case of Donovan v. 
Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm.31 According to the Ninth Circuit, a federal 
statute of general applicability, absent express language manifesting a clear 
intent otherwise, will not apply to Native American tribes if: (1) “the law 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 761 (1985). 
 26. Id. at 766. 
 27. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986) (quoting Menominee Tribe v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968)).  
 28. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987). 
 29. Id. at 18 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 n.14 (1982)). 
 30. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999) 
(citing United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-40 (1986)). 
 31. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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touches ‘exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural 
matters’”32; (2) “the application of the law to the tribe would ‘abrogate 
rights guaranteed by Indian treaties’”33; or (3) “there is proof ‘by legislative 
history or some other means that Congress intended [the law] not to apply 
to Indians on their reservations . . . .’”34 If any of these exceptions apply, 
express congressional intent is required before the statute will bind Native 
American tribes. Despite the continuous Supreme Court precedent 
supporting application of the Indian canons of construction, many circuits 
have expressed strong support for the Ninth Circuit’s decision and have 
themselves adopted a combination of the Tuscarora rule and the Coeur 
d’Alene rule. It is this analysis that currently guides the Second, Seventh, 
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in determining the reach of federal 
statutes when they are silent as to Native American tribes. 
1. Rights of Self-Governance in Purely Intramural Matters 
The first exception that the Ninth Circuit carved out of the Tuscarora rule 
is that when enforcement of a federal statute interferes with tribal rights of 
self-governance in purely intramural matters, the statute should not apply to 
Native American tribes. Paramount to this inquiry is determining what 
rights are affected by application of the statute and to what extent. In Coeur 
d’Alene, the Ninth Circuit was clear that not all tribal businesses and 
commercial activities should be exempt from federal regulation. Rather, 
only those that are “purely intramural” should be granted immunity.35 
While there is some inconsistency with what constitutes a “purely 
intramural” matter, it is clear that conditions of tribal membership, 
inheritance rules, and domestic relations are examples of activities deemed 
to be purely intramural.36 The court in Coeur d’Alene explained that a farm 
conducting business on the open market and selling produce in interstate 
commerce was not purely intramural, therefore making it subject to federal 
regulations.37 Notably, the court found it relevant that the farm employed 
non-Indians as well as Indians, making it “neither profoundly intramural . . . 
nor essential to self-government.”38 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
242 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
 
 
In addition to the ability to regulate purely intramural matters, tribes 
retain within their sovereign powers the right to regulate the conduct of 
non-Indians who “enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its 
members.”39 Consensual relationships that give rise to sovereign authority 
include commercial dealings, contracts, leases, and other types of 
arrangements.40 Similarly, when a non-Indian engages in conduct on tribal 
land that “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the 
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe,” the tribe retains the 
inherent right to exercise authority over them.41 
2. Abrogation of Rights Guaranteed by Indian Treaties 
The second exception requires that when enforcement of a statute would 
abrogate rights secured by Indian treaties, the statute should not apply to 
Native American tribes without express congressional intent.42 Treaties are 
a significant source of Indian rights because treaty making was a prevalent 
practice in the nineteenth century as a way for the government to acquire 
lands for the newly developed and expanding nation.43 The practice of 
entering into treaties with Native Americans was discontinued in 1871 with 
the implementation of the Indian Appropriation Act, which expressly states: 
[N]o Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United 
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent 
nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may 
contract by treaty: Provided, further, that nothing herein 
contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair the 
obligation of any treaty therefore lawfully made and ratified with 
any such Indian nation or tribe.44 
Thus, while the federal government no longer enters into treaties with 
Native American tribes, they are still enforceable as law.45 The Supreme 
Court held, in United States v. Winans, that “a treaty was not a grant of 
rights to the Indians, but a grant of right[s] from them—a reservation of 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).  
 40. Id. at 566. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL 
ANOMALY 102-03 (1994). 
 44. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 
71 (2000)). 
 45. PRUCHA, supra note 43, at 102-03.  
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those not granted,” meaning that any rights not specifically granted away 
are reserved to the Indian tribe. Additionally, the Court held in Winans that 
treaties are to be construed as “[the Indians] understood it” at the time the 
treaty was signed and “as justice and reason demand.”46 Any ambiguities in 
construing the treaties should be resolved in favor of the tribes. The 
Supreme Court has upheld this notion time and time again, stating in 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, “if there [is] ambiguity . . . the doubt 
would benefit the Tribe, for ‘[a]mbiguities in federal law have been 
construed generously in order to comport with . . . traditional notions of 
sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal 
independence.’”47 
Again, as with the definition of “purely intramural,” discrepancies have 
occurred in the courts’ interpretation of the word “abrogate.” In United 
States v. Dion, the Supreme Court held, “[We do not] construe statutes as 
abrogating treaty rights in a backhanded way; in the absence of explicit 
statement, the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty right is not to be 
lightly imputed to the Congress.”48 The Seventh Circuit, however, 
disagreed that “abrogate” and “modify” mean the same thing in Smart v. 
State Farm Insurance Co., stating, “[s]imply because a treaty exists does 
not by necessity compel a conclusion that a federal statute of general 
applicability is not binding on an Indian tribe . . . . The critical issue is 
whether application of the statute would jeopardize a right that is secure by 
the treaty.”49 Alas, the Supreme Court has the final say, so the current 
interpretation of “abrogate” is the same as “to modify.” 
3. Proof of Legislative Intent 
The final exception states that unless there is clear evidence, by 
legislative history or other means, that Congress intended the statute to 
apply to Native American tribes, tribal employers should be exempt from 
it.50 Only when there is “clear and reliable evidence,” either in the statute 
itself or surrounding circumstances, that Congress intended Native 
Americans to be subject to the statute should an exception be made.   
                                                                                                                 
 46. United States v. Winans, 1998 U.S. 371, 380 (1905). 
 47. 455 U.S. 130, 152 (1982) (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 
U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980)).  
 48. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986) (quoting Menominee Tribe v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968)).  
 49. Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 934-35 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 50. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 113, 116 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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The Supreme Court has yet to articulate a clear standard to guide courts 
in determining whether there is clear and reliable evidence of intent in the 
face of congressional silence. In United States v. Dion, the Supreme Court 
considered whether the Bald Eagle Protection Act, which criminalizes the 
act of hunting bald eagles, applied to a Native American convicted of 
shooting and killing four bald eagles on the reservation where he lived.51 
The Court required that “Congress’ intention to abrogate Indian treaty 
rights be clear and plain,” and offered the following guidance: 
Where the evidence of congressional intent to abrogate is 
sufficiently compelling, the weight of the authority indicates that 
such an intent can also be found by a reviewing court from clear 
and reliable evidence in the legislative history of the statute. 
What is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually 
considered the conflict between its intended action on the one 
hand and the Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to 
resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.52  
The Court stated that while explicit statements are preferable, they are 
not required and intent may be derived from the statute’s legislative history, 
surrounding circumstances, and the face of the Act.53 This statement, 
however, does nothing to guide courts in determining whether Congress’ 
intent is “clear and plain” when both the statute and legislative history are 
silent as to its applicability to Native Americans. As a result, courts have 
continued to struggle with what constitutes “clear and reliable evidence,” as 
demonstrated in the way this analysis has been applied to the various 
federal labor and employment statutes. 
D. History of Applicability of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to 
Native American Tribes 
Many aspects of the relationship between employers and their employees 
are regulated by the federal government, including: discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, and disability; safety 
and health; benefit plans; wages and hours; and collective bargaining. Most 
of these statutes are silent in regards to whether they apply to tribes. As a 
result, courts have been dealt the task of sorting out which statutes apply to 
tribal employers and which ones do not, often taking inconsistent 
approaches. The majority of circuits have adopted the Ninth Circuit’s 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Dion, 476 U.S. at 735. 
 52. Id. at 739-40. 
 53. Id. at 739. 
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approach, completely ignoring Supreme Court precedent to the contrary. 
The Tenth Circuit, however, has resisted the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene 
approach, and instead followed the precedent set by the Supreme Court.  
1. Antidiscrimination Statutes 
Antidiscrimination statutes prohibit employers from discriminating 
against their employees based on race, color, national origin, sex, and 
religion. Among these statutes are the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII), the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and section 1983. Courts have 
repeatedly held that these statutes do not apply to Native American tribes 
because their application would interfere with tribal rights of self-
government, and Congress did not intend such interference. Title VII and 
the ADA both expressly exclude Native American tribes from their 
definition of “employers.”54 In Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court 
explained that the exclusion of Indian tribes from the definition of 
“employers” reflects the “longstanding federal policy of providing a unique 
legal status to Indians in matters concerning tribal ‘on or near’ reservation 
employment,”55 effectively allowing them to conduct their own affairs. This 
express language in both the ADA and Title VII has left little room for 
ambiguity, simplifying the issue for the courts and streamlining the judicial 
process. When the statute is silent, however, the issue becomes more 
complicated. 
2. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967 to protect older workers from 
discrimination practices, such as age caps, that have no relation to the actual 
requirements of a job.56 The definition of “employer” in the ADEA is 
virtually identical to the definition of “employer” in Title VII, except for 
the simple fact that the ADEA does not expressly exclude Native American 
tribes, while Title VII does. The ADEA is completely silent as to the 
applicability of the statute to tribal employers, making no mention of them 
                                                                                                                 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) (“The term ‘employer’ . . . does not include (1) . . . an 
Indian, tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to 
procedures of the competitive service . . . .“); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(i) (2012) (“The term 
‘employer’ does not include—(i) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the 
government of the United States, or an Indian tribe . . . .”). 
 55. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 548 (1974). 
 56. Jonathan M. Purver, Proof of Discrimination Under Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 44 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 79 (1997). 
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whatsoever and leaving it up to the interpretation of the courts. The three 
circuits that have considered the issue of whether the ADEA applies to 
Native American tribes—the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits—have all 
held that it does not. However, their analyses are drastically different, with 
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits applying the Coeur d’Alene rule and the 
Tenth Circuit applying the Indian canons of construction. 
 In EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, a charge of age discrimination was 
brought against the Cherokee Nation’s Director of Health and Human 
Services.57 The EEOC attempted to enforce a subpoena to force the 
Cherokee Nation to produce documents.58 The Cherokee Nation refused to 
comply with the subpoena, reasoning that the ADEA did not apply to them 
as there was no congressional intent to include tribes within its reach.59 The 
Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of the Cherokee Nation, holding that the ADEA 
did not apply to Indian tribes because “normal rules of construction do not 
apply when Indian treaty rights, or even non-treaty matters involving 
Indians, are at issue.”60 Relying on the strong precedent that ambiguous 
statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of tribes, the court applied the 
Indian canons of construction and concluded that the EEOC had not 
demonstrated a clear indication of congressional intent sufficient to 
overcome the deference granted to tribes.61 The court explained: 
Like the Supreme Court, we have been “extremely reluctant to 
find congressional abrogation of treaty rights” absent explicit 
statutory language. We are also mindful that we should not 
“construe statutes as abrogating treaty rights in a ‘backhanded 
way’; in the absence of explicit statement, ‘the intention to 
abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the 
Congress.’ Indian treaty rights are too fundamental to be easily 
cast aside.”62 
Seemingly different in its approach, the Eighth Circuit also affirmed 
dismissal of an age discrimination case brought by a tribally owned and 
operated business in EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equipment & 
Construction Co., ruling that the ADEA did not apply to tribal employers 
                                                                                                                 
 57. 871 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1989).  
 58. Id. at 938. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 939. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 938 (citation omitted).  
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without clear congressional intent.63 The court found it relevant that the 
dispute at issue was a strictly internal matter, suggesting a Coeur d’Alene 
analysis.64 However, the court also cited Supreme Court precedent, holding 
that “[s]ubjecting such an employment relationship between the tribal 
member and his tribe to federal control and supervision dilutes the 
sovereignty of the tribe.”65 Ultimately, the tribe had the ability to regulate 
whether a tribal member’s age affected their employability “in accordance 
with [tribal] culture and traditions.”66 Nevertheless, the court specified that 
this was a narrow holding, and limited its scope to cases involving “a 
member of the tribe, the tribe as an employer, and on the reservation 
employment,” essentially leaving the door open for a different outcome in 
cases involving non-tribal employees, non-tribal employers, or employment 
located off reservation.67  
In EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Housing Authority, the Ninth Circuit addressed 
whether the Karuk Tribe was immune from judicial enforcement of a 
subpoena issued by the EEOC in response to allegations of an ADEA 
violation.68 The Karuk Tribe Housing Authority owned and operated low-
income housing located on tribal land held in trust.69 Out of 100 available 
units, Native American families occupied ninety-nine of the homes.70 In 
addition, the Housing Authority employed twenty-four employees, twenty 
of whom were Native American. The Ninth Circuit utilized the standard set 
in Coeur d’Alene to determine whether or not the ADEA could apply to the 
Tribe. The court held that the ADEA did not apply to the Housing 
Authority because of its unique role as the provider of an important 
governmental service, noting the importance of “affordable homes in safe 
and healthy environments on Indian reservations [and] in Indian 
communities as a means to achieve self-sufficiency and self-
determination.”71 The dispute was intramural because it arose between a 
member of the Tribe and the tribal government, and did “not concern non-
Karuks or non-Indians as employers, employees, customers, or anything 
                                                                                                                 
 63. 986 F.2d 246, 247-48 (8th Cir. 1993). 
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 67. Id. at 251. 
 68. See EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Housing Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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else.”72 Hence, when a dispute does not concern non-tribal members, it is 
profoundly intramural. 
3. Regulation of Terms and Conditions 
In addition to anti-discrimination statutes, there are several labor and 
employment statutes that regulate terms and conditions of employment. 
These statutes include the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), the 
Employment Retirement Income and Security Act (ERISA), the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA), and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and 
they have all been analyzed by courts with respect to their applicability to 
tribal employers. 
a) Occupational Safety and Health Act  
The OSHA was enacted in 1970 to ensure safe and healthy working 
conditions for employees.73 OSHA was first analyzed in regards to its 
applicability to Native American tribes in Donovan v. Navajo Forest 
Products Industries when the Secretary of Labor sought enforcement of a 
citation issued to Navajo Forest Products Industries (NFPI), a logging 
company owned and operated by the Navajo tribe and located on the 
Navajo reservation.74 In Navajo Forest Products Industries, the Tenth 
Circuit held that, even though the parties agreed that NFPI fell within 
OSHA’s definition of “employer,” application of the statute to the Navajo 
tribe would conflict with a pre-existing treaty provision granting the Navajo 
tribe the right to exclude non-Indian persons from the reservation.75 
Because enforcement of the statute interfered with a pre-existing treaty 
right, the court refused to apply it absent congressional intent. In regards to 
the treaty, the court stated that an express treaty granting rights of exclusion 
was not a necessary component to their analysis, as Native American tribes 
maintain an inherent right of exclusion as “an inherent attribute of tribal 
sovereignty, essential to a tribe’s exercise of self-government and territorial 
management.”76 Therefore, even in the absence of an express treaty, the 
statutory canons of construction apply and Native American tribes may 
exclude unauthorized individuals from their land, making enforcement of 
OSHA nearly impossible when the employer is located on the reservation. 
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Contrarily, the Ninth Circuit rejected the notion that the power of 
exclusion is an “inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty,” finding instead 
that OSHA applies to Native American tribes in situations where there is no 
express treaty granting the tribe specific rights of exclusion. In Coeur 
d’Alene, the court refused to recognize the operation of an on-reservation 
farm as “purely intramural,” explaining: 
The operation of a farm that sells produce on the open market 
and in interstate commerce is not an aspect of self-government. 
Because the farm employs non-Indians as well as Indians, and 
because it is in virtually every respect a normal commercial 
farming enterprise, we believe that its operation free of federal 
health and safety regulations is ‘neither profoundly 
intramural . . . nor essential to self-government.77 
Similarly, six years later, in United States Department of Labor v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, the Ninth Circuit 
considered whether OSHA applied to a tribally owned lumber mill that 
employed both Native American and non-Native American employees and 
sold lumber outside the reservation. Although the court recognized that 
revenue from the mill was “critical”78 to the success of the tribal 
government, the court ultimately found that the mill was not “purely 
intramural” because it employed a “significant number of non-Native 
Americans and [sold] virtually all of its finished products to non-Native 
Americans through channels of interstate commerce.”79 Therefore, 
enforcement of the OSHA did not affect the tribe’s “exclusive rights of self-
governance.” Despite the treaty expressly granting the tribe the right to 
exclude unauthorized persons from their reservation, the court found that 
this right was insufficient to bar the “limited entry necessary to enforce the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act” and shield the tribe from 
compliance.80 The court further explained that the conflict between the 
treaty right and the enforcement of the statute must be more direct to bar 
enforcement of the statute because, “were [it] to construe the Treaty right of 
exclusion broadly to bar application of the Act, the enforcement of nearly 
all generally applicable federal laws would be nullified.”81 Abstract 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 78. U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 935 F.2d 
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applications of treaties are not sufficient to exempt tribes from a federal 
statute; rather, they must be specific to the right being “abrogated.” 
b) Employment Retirement Income and Security Act  
The ERISA was enacted in 1974 to reform the private retirement system 
in favor of retirees while recognizing the voluntary nature of private 
retirement plans.82 Similar to the later cases concerning the applicability of 
OSHA, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have determined that ERISA applies 
to Native American tribes because its enforcement does not interfere with 
tribal rights of self-governance.  
In Lumber Industry Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Products 
Industry, Lumber Industry Pension Fund sought to recover pension 
contributions from a tribally owned and operated sawmill located on the 
reservation.83 The mill argued that, as a result of a tribal ordinance that 
mandated the transfer of tribal employees to a tribal pension plan, they 
could not be required to comply with ERISA.84 The Ninth Circuit was 
unconvinced by this argument, holding, “[f]ederal law does not give way to 
a tribal ordinance unless the federal law encroaches on exclusive rights of 
self-governance, abrogates treaty rights, or was intended by Congress not to 
apply to Indians.”85 Because the application of ERISA did not prevent tribal 
employees from joining the tribal pension plan, the court held that 
application of ERISA did not usurp the tribe’s decision-making power and, 
therefore, applied to the tribal employer.86 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held that ERISA applies to Native 
American tribes because its enforcement is less invasive than OSHA and 
federal tax withholding requirements, both of which have been applied to 
tribes.87 The plaintiff, a tribal-member employee of the Chippewa Health 
Center, brought an action against State Farm for refusing to pay a claim for 
medical expenses under a group insurance policy issued by State Farm.88 
The court’s analysis came down to one question: “whether Congress 
intended ERISA to include an employment benefit plan which is 
established and maintained by an Indian tribe employer for the benefit of 
                                                                                                                 
 82. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012). 
 83. 939 F.2d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 84. Id. at 685. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 685-86.   
 87. See Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 935-36, 938, 938 n.6 (7th Cir. 
1989). 
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Indian employees working at an establishment located entirely on an Indian 
reservation.”89 Finding that the application of ERISA would not affect the 
tribe’s ability to govern itself in purely intramural matters, and finding no 
clear evidence of congressional intent to exempt Native American tribes 
from its reach, the court held that ERISA applied to the Chippewa Health 
Center employee benefits plan.90 
c) Fair Labor Standards Act 
In order to ensure certain minimum labor standard for employees 
working in industries engaged in commerce (such as overtime 
requirements), Congress enacted the FLSA.91 Application of the FLSA is 
distinguishable from that of OSHA and ERISA. Utilizing the Coeur 
d’Alene test, Courts have held that application of the FLSA would in fact 
interfere with tribal rights of self-governance. In Reich v. Great Lakes 
Indian Fish & Wildlife Commission, the Department of Labor sought to 
enforce a subpoena seeking evidence that a tribe’s Indian Fish and Wildlife 
Commission violated the FLSA.92 Rather than apply the reasoning 
employed in the interpretation of the ADEA, OSHA, and ERISA, the 
Seventh Circuit focused on reasonableness, as well as the importance of 
“leav[ing] the administration of Indian affairs for the most part to the 
Indians themselves” as “the exercise of usufructuary rights off the 
reservation is as important to the Indians as the exercise of their occupancy 
rights within the reservations and, maybe more so.”93 The court 
differentiated this case from previous cases applying the ERISA and OSHA 
by the fact that the employees in previous cases were engaged in “routine 
activities of a commercial service or character . . . rather than of a 
governmental character.”94  
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in Solis v. Matheson, considered whether 
the FLSA applied to Baby Zack’s Smoke Shop. Baby Zack’s was a retail 
store located on the Puyallup reservation and owned and operated by a 
member of the Puyallup Tribe.95 Baby Zack’s employed both Native 
Americans and non-Native Americans, and sold products to both Native 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. at 932. 
 90. Id. at 938. 
 91. Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 92. Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm’n, 4 F.3d 490, 491 (7th Cir. 
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 93. Id. at 494. 
 94. Id. at 495. 
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Americans and non-Native Americans as well.96 The court found that, 
because the employer in this case was a “purely commercial enterprise 
engaged in interstate commerce selling out-of-state goods to non-Indians 
and employing non-Indians,” there was nothing profoundly intramural 
about the business that warranted an exemption to the Act.97 Additionally, 
Baby Zack’s asserted that they were exempt because of the Medicine Creek 
Treaty, which stated, in part, “[t]he said tribes and bands agree to free all 
slaves now held by them, and not to purchase or acquire others hereafter.”98 
Any treaty invoked “must be construed as the Indians would naturally have 
understood it at the time of the treaty, with doubtful or ambiguous 
expressions resolved in the Indians’ favor.”99 Unlike in other cases where 
tribes were granted exemption from a federal law based on a treaty 
exception, the treaty invoked by Baby Zack’s was not directly on point, 
making no mention of employment, wages, or hours. The court did not find 
the language in the treaty to be so ambiguous that it could be interpreted as 
discussing minimum wage requirements. Enforcement of the Act did not 
interfere with treaty rights and therefore was not in conflict with the 
Medicine Creek Treaty. 
d) National Labor Relations Act 
The NLRA has been found to exempt Native American tribes from its 
coverage but only in some instances. The National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB), first addressed the applicability of the Act to Native American 
tribes in Fort Apache Timber Co., where the Board found that “an Indian 
tribal governing council qua government, acting to direct the utilization of 
tribal resources through a tribal commercial enterprise on the tribe's own 
reservation,” was not an “employer” under the NLRA.100 Similarly, in 
Southern Indian Health Council, the Board did not extend jurisdiction over 
a health care clinic owned and operated by multiple Indian tribes. The clinic 
was located on the reservation and governed by a board of directors, all of 
whom were appointed by governing members of the tribes themselves.101 
The NLRB found that, because a governing body appointed the board 
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members, the Southern Indian Health Council was itself a “government 
entity” and therefore exempt from the NLRA.102  
Contrarily, in Sac and Fox Industries, the NLRB found it had 
jurisdiction over a business which was “operated by a tribal government 
agency at an off-reservation facility.”103 Although the facility was owned by 
a tribal entity, it was not located on tribal land and therefore not exempt 
from the Act.104 
These three cases were in direct contradiction with each other. Therefore, 
in Sam Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, the Board expressly overruled 
Fort Apache Timber Co. and Southern Indian Health Council and instead 
upheld its holding in Sac and Fox Industries.105 Despite its 
acknowledgement of the subsequent contradictory precedent, the Board 
determined that, in the absence of an express statement by the Supreme 
Court overruling Tuscarora, it is bound to follow it.106 Accordingly, the 
Board followed the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene test and, finding nothing to 
suggest that Congress intended to exclude tribes from the Act’s breadth, it 
determined that Native Americans are not exempt.107 The Board’s 
contradictory opinions are illustrative of the uncertainty that was created by 
Tuscarora and evidence of a need for clarification by the Supreme Court on 
what the correct standard is.108 
In NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc., the NLRB sought 
enforcement of a subpoena against several members of Chapa’s 
management staff.109 Chapa was a tribal organization that provided free 
health services to Native Americans within a specific geographic area in 
Northern California, in addition to providing services to non-Native 
Americans.110 While there were tribal members on Chapa’s Health 
Advisory Committee, no tribal members served on Chapa’s board.111 In 
addition, Chapa was financially independent from the tribe and employed 
both Native American and non-Native American employees.112 Chapa 
argued that meeting the health care needs of Native Americans is a purely 
                                                                                                                 
 102.  Id. 
 103. Sac & Fox Indus., Ltd., 307 N.L.R.B. 241 (1992). 
 104. Id. at 241, 245. 
 105. In re San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1055 (2004). 
 106. Id. at 1061. 
 107. Id. at 1058. 
 108. Sac & Fox Indus., Ltd., 307 N.L.R.B. at 241, 245. 
 109. NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Servs., Inc., 316 F.3d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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 112. Id. at 997, 1000.  
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intramural matter and, therefore, they were exempt from the NLRA.113 
Noting that at least half of Chapa’s employees were non-Native Americans 
and that Chapa was not owned by a tribe, but merely contracted with one, 
the Ninth Circuit, utilizing the Coeur d’Alene test, found that the NLRA did 
not clearly touch on purely intramural matters affecting rights of self-
governance and the NLRA applied.114 
IV. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
Signed into law on March 23, 2010, the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) is one of the most significant and controversial 
pieces of legislation in recent history. The eleven-thousand-page document 
is intended to increase the number of Americans covered under health 
insurance while decreasing the overall cost of health care through a number 
of provisions: an individual mandate, insurance exchanges, Medicaid 
expansion, and an employer mandate.115 The individual mandate requires 
most Americans (members of Native American tribes receiving healthcare 
through Indian Health Services are among those exempt)116 to purchase 
health insurance or pay a fine.117 State-based insurance exchanges help 
make insurance affordable through premium and cost sharing subsidies.118 
Medicaid expansion has permitted states to expand Medicaid up to 138% of 
the federally recognized poverty level.119 Lastly, the employer mandate 
requires certain employers to provide health insurance coverage to their 
employees or pay a fine.120 
A. Play or Pay 
“Play or pay” refers to the employer mandate provision contained within 
the ACA. Under this provision, “applicable large employers” are 
encouraged to “play” by offering “minimum essential coverage” to full time 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Id. at 999. 
 114. Id. at 1000. 
 115. Affordable Care Act Summary, OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obamacarefacts.com/ 
affordablecareact-summary.php (last visited Aug. 24, 2014). 
 116. ObamaCare Employer Mandate, supra note 5. 
 117. ObamaCare Individual Mandate, OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obamacarefacts.com/ 
obamacare-individual-mandate.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).  
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 119. ObamaCare Medicaid Expansion, OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obamacarefacts.com/ 
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employees and their beneficiaries or pay a fine: hence “play or pay.”121 
Applicable large employers are those that employ fifty or more full time 
employees (FTEs) or full time equivalents.122 Full time equivalents differ 
from full time employees in that full time equivalents are used to determine 
whether an employer is a “large employer” subject to the Act.123 Full time 
equivalents are determined by adding the total number of hours worked by 
all employees and dividing by 120 (the number of monthly hours worked 
by one full time employee).124 For example, if ten employees worked a total 
of 360 hours, the employer would have three full-time equivalents 
(360/120). Full-time employees are simply defined as those who work an 
average of thirty hours per week.125 
Coverage offered by an employer must meet certain minimum 
requirements and must be affordable.126 Under the ACA, a health plan is 
not affordable if the employer’s required contribution to the health care 
plan exceeds 9.5% of total household income, or 40% of covered expenses 
for a typical population.127 Applicable large employers who choose not to 
“play” will not pay a fine unless and until one or more of its full time 
employees receives federally subsidized health care through a state-based 
health insurance exchange.128 The fine, officially known as the “Employer 
Shared Responsibility Payment,” is based on the number of full time 
employees, minus the first thirty, even if just one employee is receiving 
federally subsidized coverage.129 Effective January 1, 2015,130 the ACA 
imposes the following penalties on employers: 
Employers with more than fifty full time equivalents that do not offer 
health care coverage and have at least one full time employee receiving a 
federal premium credit or cost sharing reduction will face a monthly fine of 
(number of full time employees minus thirty) x (two thousand dollars 
divided by twelve, or $166.67). This is equal to two thousand dollars per 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Id. 
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year per full time employee.131 Therefore, an employer with fifty employees 
will pay an annual fee of forty thousand dollars. 
Employers with more than fifty full time equivalents that offer coverage 
that does not meet the “minimum essential coverage” requirements, or is 
not affordable, and have at least one full time employee receiving a federal 
premium credit or cost sharing reduction will face a monthly fine of the 
lesser of: (number of full time employees minus thirty) x (two thousand 
dollars divided by twelve, or $166.67) OR (number of full time employees 
receiving federal premium credits) x (three thousand dollars divided by 
twelve, or $250.00).132  
While assessed monthly, fines are due annually on employer federal tax 
returns.133 In addition, employers with two hundred or more full time 
employees must automatically enroll them in a health insurance plan, which 
the employees can then choose to opt out of.134 The numerous requirements 
and provisions of the ACA have left employers nothing short of confused, 
and silence as to the Act’s applicability to Native American employers has 
only amplified the issue.   
B. Should Native American Employers Be Subject to the Employer Mandate 
of the ACA? 
In the short time since it was signed into law, there have been countless 
lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the ACA. The Supreme Court 
recently decided a highly publicized case brought by Hobby Lobby, a 
national Christian-owned chain of arts-and-crafts stores, seeking an 
exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement of the ACA’s 
employer mandate based on religious reasons.135 The immediate effect of 
this decision is that private for-profit corporations subject to the employer-
mandate coverage requirements of the ACA cannot be required to provide 
contraceptive coverage if doing so would violate a sincerely held religious 
belief. It is unclear what other exemptions will be granted and to whom; 
however, the door is unequivocally open for objections to be raised and 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  
Although members of Native American tribes are expressly exempt from 
the individual mandate, nowhere in the Act is mention made of the 
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applicability of the ACA's employer mandate to Native American 
employers owning and operating a business employing Native Americans 
and non-Native Americans on a reservation. The Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS), the department responsible for administering the tax provisions 
included in the statute,136 issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) 
in December 2012, addressing “Shared Responsibility for Employers 
Regarding Health Coverage.”137 This NPRM addressed the issue of who 
qualifies as an “employer,” stating that the employer mandate “applies to all 
common law employers, including an employer that is a government entity 
(such as Federal, State, local or Indian tribal government entities) . . . .”138 
However, these guidelines were merely proposals and a current publication 
released by the IRS makes no mention of Native American employers at 
all.139 In fact, it does not provide any guidance whatsoever as to what types 
of employers are subject to the employer mandate, with the exception of 
“large” and “small” employers.140 
This silence has caused confusion for Native American employers, and 
made applicability of the ACA ambiguous, particularly in light of the 
confusion over which test to apply. Consistent with the general rule of 
Tuscarora and the exceptions to that rule, one must determine whether the 
ACA is a statute of general applicability and whether its application to 
Native American tribes would modify an existing right secured by treaty or 
another right essential to self-governance of purely intramural matters. 
Lastly, one must determine if there is proof, whether by legislative history 
or some other means, that Congress intended Native American employers 
to be exempt from the Act. If following Supreme Court precedent, however, 
the canons of construction apply, requiring a clear expression by Congress 
that the ACA was intended to apply to tribal employers and liberal 
interpretation with ambiguities resolved in favor of the tribes.   
The rising trend of Native American employers employing non-Native 
American employees has blurred the requirements of the employer mandate 
for tribal employers attempting to navigate the ACA's various provisions. 
Additionally, the statute is unclear as to whether Native Americans 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Affordable Care Act (ACA) Tax Provisions, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Afford 
able-Care-Act-Tax-Provisions-Home (last visited Sep. 6, 2014). 
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constitute an “employee” under the Act for purposes of determining if a 
business is an “applicably large employer” subject to the penalty tax. 
Therefore, to analyze this issue, this article will focus specifically on two 
scenarios: tribal businesses owned and operated by Native Americans, 
located on Native American land, that employ (1) solely Native American 
employees and (2) both Native American and non-Native American 
employees. 
To aid in understanding the complex and multifaceted scenarios that can 
play out under the “play or pay” provision of the ACA, this Comment will 
utilize the hypothetical example of Never-Win casino, a tribally owned and 
operated business located on a tribal reservation. While the majority of its 
revenues are derived from Native Americans, it does business with non-
Native Americans also. Knowing that “applicable large employers” are 
those employing fifty or more employees, the owner of Never-Win Casino 
needs to know if his business is exempt from the Act or if he needs to 
provide health care coverage to Never-Win's fifty-one employees. Utilizing 
the Coeur d’Alene Rule, the first step is determining if the ACA is a statute 
of general applicability. 
1. Is the ACA a Statute of General Applicability?  
Just as the OSHA, ERISA, and various other federal labor and 
employment statutes are generally applicable, so too is the employer 
mandate of the ACA because it is not directed at one specific group of 
people. Rather, it encompasses all those that fit within the definition of 
“employer” provided by the ACA. While certain parts of the Act, such as 
the individual mandate, have exemptions, these alone are not dispositive in 
determining whether a statute is generally applicable.141 As the Ninth 
Circuit stated, “[t]he issue is whether the statute is generally applicable, not 
whether it is universally applicable.”142 The OSHA and ERISA both contain 
exemptions, yet courts found both to be generally applicable.143 
Furthermore, the exemptions granted by the ACA are applicable to the 
individual mandate, not the employer mandate. The individual mandate and 
the employer mandate, while part of the same statute, are distinctly separate 
from each other. In fact, the only exception that the employer mandate 
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contains is the exception for employers that employ fewer than fifty full 
time equivalents. All other employers fall directly within the Act’s 
definition of “employer.” It is clear that the employer mandate was intended 
to have a relatively broad reach, making the ACA a statute of general 
applicability. Because the ACA is a statute of general applicability and 
Native Americans are not expressly exempt from its reach, the Coeur 
d’Alene Rule dictates that it applies to Never-Win Casino unless the Casino 
can show that it falls into one of the three exceptions to the rule. The Indian 
canons of construction, however, require that: (1) the statute does not apply 
in the absence of express congressional intent; and (2) ambiguities must be 
construed broadly, in favor of the tribes.144  
2. Exceptions to Application: Exclusive Rights of Self-Governance in 
Purely Intramural Matters 
The first exception to the Coeur d'Alene Rule states that statutes which 
interfere with exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural 
matters should not apply to tribal employers.145 Whether a statute interferes 
with exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters 
largely depends on the type of business, whether the business engages in 
commerce with non-Native Americans, and whether it employs solely 
Native Americans, or Native Americans as well as non-Native Americans. 
a) Tribal Businesses Employing Solely Native American Employees 
Tribal businesses that exclusively employ Native Americans should not 
be subject to the penalties imposed for non-compliance with the employer 
mandate of the ACA because these penalties would affect exclusive rights 
of self-governance in purely intramural matters. In Karuk, the issue was 
purely intramural because it was between a member of the Tribe and the 
tribal government and did “not concern non-Karuks or non-Indians as 
employers, employees, customers, or anything else.”146 Similarly, in Coeur 
d’Alene, the court found that, because the tribal business employed non-
Native Americans, it was “neither profoundly intramural . . . nor essential to 
self-government.”147 Therefore, tribal businesses located on tribal land that 
solely employ Native Americans should be exempt from the employer 
mandate of the ACA. However, in our hypothetical even if all fifty-one of 
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Never-Win Casino’s employees were Native American, Never-Win Casino 
might still not be exempt under the first exception because they engage in 
commerce with non-Native American individuals. If, however, Never-Win 
Casino catered exclusively to Native Americans, then it would be engaging 
in purely intramural matters and, therefore, would be exempt from the 
mandate. 
b) Tribal Businesses Employing Both Native Americans and Non-Native 
Americans 
It is well established that businesses that employ non-Native American 
employees are not engaged in “purely intramural matters.” Therefore, 
Never-Win Casino should not be exempt from the ACA in such instances. 
Courts consider employment of non-Native American employees as a factor 
“weighing heavily” against this exception because tribal operations 
affecting open markets are not focused on serving primarily tribal 
members.148 The Supreme Court reasoned,  
[i]n determining the extent of the sovereign powers that the 
tribes retained in submitting to the authority of the United States, 
this Court has recognized a fundamental distinction between the 
right of the tribes to govern their own internal affairs and the 
right to exercise powers affecting nonmembers of the tribe.149  
The Court has emphasized that “exercise of tribal power beyond what is 
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is 
inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive 
without express congressional delegation.”150 Therefore, if thirty of Never-
Win Casino’s employees were Native American and twenty-one were non-
Native American, Never-Win Casino would not be exempt from the Act 
under this exception to the Coeur d’Alene Rule. 
3. Abrogation of Rights Guaranteed by Indian Treaties 
There is a long and well-established history of the federal government’s 
obligation to provide health care services to Native Americans.151 The 
government’s role in providing health care services to Indians has remained 
an important aspect of the relationship between the government and Native 
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Americans, as acknowledged by Congress with the passage of the Indian 
Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA).152 The IHCIA states that health 
services “[o]f the Indians are consonant with and required by the Federal 
Government’s historical and unique legal relationship with, and resulting 
responsibility to, the American Indian people.”153 Interestingly, Congress 
permanently authorized the IHCIA as part and parcel of the ACA in 2010, 
on the same day that the ACA was signed into law.154  
When enforcement of a statute would abrogate or modify rights secured 
by Indian treaties, the statute should not apply to Native American tribes.155 
Therefore, when there is an existing treaty concerning governmental 
obligation to provide health care services, tribal businesses that employ 
exclusively Native American employees should not be subjected to the 
penalties imposed for non-compliance with the employer mandate of the 
ACA because enforcement would abrogate an existing treaty right.  
Alternatively, while a treaty between a tribe and the federal government 
may obligate the government to provide health services to Native 
Americans, it would not require the federal government to provide health 
services to non-Native Americans. If Never-Win Casino employs non-
Native employees, a treaty right to health services would not be abrogated. 
Enforcement of the ACA in these instances would only affect the tribe in as 
far as the Casino would be required to provide health care coverage to non-
tribal members. It would not abrogate any tribal treaty rights and Never-
Win Casino should not be granted an exemption to the employer mandate 
based on this exception to the Coeur d’Alene rule.   
C. Canons of Construction 
Despite the Coeur d’Alene rule, Supreme Court precedent mandates 
application of the Indian canons of construction. Therefore, the Act’s 
employer mandate should not apply to tribal employers unless there is a 
clear and unambiguous expression by Congress that it intended tribal 
employers to fall squarely within the Act’s reach. Additionally, in the event 
that there is an ambiguity, it should be resolved in favor of the tribes. 
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Congress expressly exempts members of Native American tribes, as well 
as other select groups, from the individual mandate of the ACA, but makes 
no mention of Native Americans whatsoever under the employer mandate. 
This silence has created confusion among tribal employers regarding 
whether they are subject to fines if they choose not to provide coverage. 
Arguably, Congress left exemptions out of the employer mandate because it 
intended there to be no exceptions. However, it is also possible that, 
because Congress expressly excluded Native Americans from the individual 
mandate, it intended to make a similar exemption for tribes in their capacity 
as employers. The ACA and the IHCIA were enacted with the goal of 
making quality health care more accessible. If Congress intended Native 
Americans to be covered under the ACA, they would not have permanently 
reauthorized the IHCIA by integrating it into the ACA.  
Nevertheless, the canons of construction require a clear expression of 
intent to include Native Americans in the application of a federal statute, 
not a clear expression of intent to exempt them. The Supreme Court has 
stated, “a clear expression of Congressional intent is necessary before a 
court may construe a federal statute so as to impair tribal sovereignty.”156 
Silence itself does not constitute a clear expression of intent and should not 
be regarded as such. Because ambiguities in a federal statute must be 
resolved in favor of Indians, ambiguities in the employer mandate of the 
ACA should be interpreted accordingly. Unequivocal Supreme Court 
precedent dictates that in cases where ambiguity exists, such as that posed 
by the ACA’s silence with respect to Native American employers, courts 
must uphold tribal sovereignty. Accordingly, there is no clear congressional 
intent sufficient to warrant application of the Act in Indian Country.  
 The inconsistent outcomes that result from applying the different tests 
are evidence of a clear need for stronger Supreme Court precedent in this 
area. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has never cited to Tuscarora, 
and that the language within it is likely dicta and not controlling, the lower 
courts have consistently cited to it as an indicator of which test to apply. In 
doing so, they have ignored the canons of construction that have been 
subsequently endorsed by the Supreme Court as the proper analysis. Such 
as with the ACA, the outcome of a case could ultimately turn on which 
analysis the court employs. For example, if the court applies the Coeur 
d’Alene test, a tribal employer might be subject to the Act’s requirements. 
On the other hand, if the court applies the canons of construction, they 
clearly would not. This is problematic both in terms of consistency and 
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predictability. The Supreme Court should reconcile this by making a clear 
and unambiguous expression that the Coeur d’Alene test is not the proper 
test to be using when determining whether a generally applicable, federal 
statute applies to Native American tribes. 
D. Public Policy 
The ACA, specifically the employer mandate, serves two purposes: to 
incentivize employers to provide health care coverage plans to their 
employees, thereby ensuring that Americans are receiving affordable access 
to health care services; and to compensate the federal government for costs 
incurred as a result of employers’ failure to do so. Native Americans, 
however, have access to health care through the Indian Health Care 
Improvement Act (IHCIA). Therefore, there is no overriding public policy 
in support of subjecting tribal businesses to the employer mandate of the 
ACA when they employ only Native Americans. Without employer-
provided insurance, Native American employees still have access to 
affordable health care without posing a burden on the federal budget.  
The public policy implications change, however, when tribal businesses 
employ non-Native Americans as well as Native Americans. Non-Native 
American employees do not have access to health care through the IHCIA. 
Rather, the majority of the population is covered by employment-based 
health insurance.157 In 2009, 59% of the overall population received health 
insurance through their employer, and that number is expected to grow with 
the implementation of the ACA.158 With such a large number of Americans 
relying on employers for affordable and quality health care, it is imperative 
that employers make every effort to make health care coverage available. 
Without the penalty tax, there is no incentive to provide this coverage and 
employees would be left at the mercy of their employer.  
Additionally, some argue that tribal businesses should be protected by 
tribal sovereign immunity from suit brought by employees under the ACA, 
because enforcement would result in a financial loss that threatens tribal 
economies. Historically Native Americans have been among the poorest of 
American minorities, specifically those living on reservations.159 Even the 
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Supreme Court has recognized an important interest in protecting the 
economic existence of Native American tribes, stating:  
Economic deprivation is among the most serious of Indian 
problems. Unemployment among Indians is ten times the 
national average; the unemployment rate runs as high as eighty 
percent on some of the poorest reservations. Eighty percent of 
reservation Indians have an income that falls below the poverty 
line . . . . It is critically important that the federal government 
support and encourage efforts which help Indians develop their 
own economic infrastructure.160 
However, a recent explosion in economic growth in Native American 
economies demonstrates that this policy may not be as strong as it once 
was. The notion that tribal economies are fragile and in need of protection 
is becoming outdated as tribes grow more business-savvy. According to the 
United States Census, Native American-owned businesses grew 28% 
between 2002 and 2007.161 The opening of high-stakes casinos on Indian 
reservations has contributed over $26 billion per year to tribal economies 
since 2007, reaching an estimated $27.9 billion in 2012.162 This boom, due 
largely to the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) in 
1988,163 is not limited to casinos. Tribal businesses are diverse and varied, 
ranging from golf courses164 to banks165 with much more in between. 
Despite the success that many tribes have experienced, many are still 
extremely weak and have not realized the financial gains shared by others. 
Application of the ACA to these tribes may in fact result in great injury to 
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them. Since many of these businesses employ non-Native American 
employees, it is increasingly important to strike a delicate balance between 
tribal sovereignty, which is crucial to tribal self-governance, and protection 
of access to health care for employees of tribal businesses.  
E. Who Constitutes an “Employee” for Purposes of Determining if a 
Business Is a “Large Employer” Subject to Penalties? 
Under the Coeur d’Alene rule, large tribal businesses with non-Native 
American employees might be subject to the penalty tax for not providing 
minimum essential health care coverage to their employees at an affordable 
rate. These penalties only apply, however, if the employer employs over 
fifty full time employees. While seemingly straightforward at first glance, 
determining who is an “employee” is more ambiguous than it initially 
appears. If Never-Win Casino employs thirty non-Native Americans and 
twenty-one Native Americans, is it considered a “large employer” subject 
to the tax or a “small employer” exempt from penalties? In addition, if 
Never-Win chooses not to provide coverage, and employs fifty non-Native 
Americans and twenty Native Americans, are they assessed a penalty, per 
employee, for fifty employees (seventy total employees minus the first 
thirty) or thirty employees (fifty non-Native American employees minus the 
first thirty)? Courts have not addressed this issue because, until now, there 
has been no need to. In other labor and employment statutes, the number of 
employees is irrelevant. Unlike those statutes, however, the applicability of 
the ACA is reliant on the number of employees. The ACA is silent on this 
issue, but congressional intent and surrounding circumstances indicate that 
Native Americans should not be considered “employees” for purposes of 
employer size and penalty assessment. 
Because Native Americans are expressly exempt from the individual 
mandate, and are therefore not required to purchase health insurance in their 
individual capacity, it is unlikely that Congress intended them to be 
considered “employees” when assessing “large employer” penalties. Native 
Americans are not subject to penalties for failing to purchase individual 
health insurance; therefore, they should not be included as “employees” 
when determining employer size and assessing penalty amounts. 
If status as a “large employer” for the purposes of ACA penalties is 
determined by the number of non-Native employees, it might encourage 
tribal businesses to refrain from hiring non-Native Americans and hire only 
Native Americans instead. While this is a possibility, it could have 
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significant benefits for the Indian population, which has suffered from 
double-digit unemployment rates since 2007.166 
Native American employers employing exclusively Native American 
employees should not be subjected to the employer mandate of the ACA 
because to do so would affect exclusive rights of self-governance in purely 
intramural matters. In addition, public policy does not support enforcement 
of the Act in these instances as Native Americans have access to health care 
coverage through the IHCIA. Contrarily, Native American employers 
employing both Native American and non-Native American employees 
should be subjected to the employer mandate because enforcement does not 
affect exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters, does 
not abrogate treaty rights, and there is no clear evidence of congressional 
intent to exempt them. However, only non-Native American employees 
should be considered “employees” for purposes of determining employer 
size and assessing penalty taxes. 
This analysis is indicative of the confusing issues that arise under the 
Coeur d’Alene test. Because employee statuses are constantly changing, it 
would be nearly impossible to keep up with whether an employer was 
subject to the Act’s requirements. However, if we apply the canons of 
construction, tribal employers are not subject to the Act’s requirements, 
thus eliminating the issue of whether Native Americans are “employees” 
for purposes of establishing the employer’s status. 
F. Calling for Clarification 
To eliminate the confusion for Native American employers, Congress 
should amend the employer mandate to expressly exempt Native American 
employers from paying penalty taxes when they employ exclusively Native 
American employees. When explaining why Native Americans were 
expressly excluded from Title VII and the ADA, Senator Mundt of South 
Dakota stated: 
The reason why it is necessary to add these words is that Indian 
tribes, in many parts of the country, are virtually political 
subdivisions of the Government. To a large extent many tribes 
control and operate their own affairs, even to the extent of 
having their own elected officials, courts and police forces. This 
amendment would provide to American Indian tribes in their 
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capacity as a political entity the same privileges accorded to the 
U.S. Government and its political subdivisions, to conduct their 
own affairs and economic activities without consideration of the 
provisions of the bill.167 
Although Senator Mundt was speaking specifically about Title VII and 
the ADA, his words ring true for virtually all federal statutes of general 
applicability and, for these same reasons, the Native American exemption 
contained in the individual mandate of the ACA should extend to the 
employer mandate as well. In addition, Congress and the Obama 
Administration should clarify whether Native Americans count as 
“employees” in the determination of a whether an employer is a large or 
small business, as well as in the assessment of penalties. 
V. Conclusion 
Health care in the United States has been at the forefront of the national 
agenda for some time now. The ACA has implemented major reforms that 
are already beginning to dramatically transform the landscape of the 
national health care system. Employers are certainly not immune to these 
changes, as the employer mandate imposes hefty penalties for employers 
who choose to forego providing health care coverage to their employees. 
However, silence on the part of the Act as to its applicability to Native 
American employers has led to confusion among tribal employers. 
Using the Coeur d’Alene test to determine whether these employers are 
exempt from the Act, tribal businesses exclusively employing Native 
Americans might be exempt from the employer mandate if they are located 
in Indian Country and do not engage in commerce with non-Native 
Americans. In contrast, businesses with non-tribal employees are not 
engaged in purely intramural commerce and will therefore likely be subject 
to the Act’s requirements. Treaties and congressional intent are also 
relevant to the application of the ACA to Native American employers. 
Treaties should be interpreted on a case-by-case basis and congressional 
intent is unclear, at best, as to whether Congress exhibited intent to exempt 
Native Americans from the Act’s requirements. 
Using the Indian canons of construction to determine whether tribal 
employers are subject to the Act’s requirements results in a different 
outcome. Because Congress has not clearly expressed its intent to subject 
tribal employers to the employer mandate, and because the Act is to be 
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construed liberally in favor of the tribes, then the Act does not apply to 
Native American employers. 
While the entire scope of the ACA remains to be seen, one thing is clear: 
there is a strong need for congressional clarification on whether Native 
American employers are subject to the “Play or Pay” provision and whether 
tribal employees should be counted when determining employer size and 
assessing penalties. With so many changes currently taking place, and more 
changes on the horizon, this clarification will go a long way in easing some 
of the confusion associated with the complex requirements of the Act. 
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